University of Alabama in Huntsville

LOUIS
National Cyber Summit

National Cyber Summit 2017

Jun 7th, 12:00 AM

Insider Threat Mitigation in Attribute-based Encryption
Runhua Xu
University of Pittsburgh, runhua.edu@pitt.edu

James B.D. Joshi
University of Pittsburgh, jjoshi@pitt.edu

Prashant Krishnamurthy
University of Pittsburgh, prashant@sis.pitt.edu

David Tipper
University of Pittsburgh, tipper@tele.pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://louis.uah.edu/cyber-summit

Recommended Citation
Xu, Runhua; Joshi, James B.D.; Krishnamurthy, Prashant; and Tipper, David, "Insider Threat Mitigation in
Attribute-based Encryption" (2017). National Cyber Summit. 17.
https://louis.uah.edu/cyber-summit/ncs2017/ncs2017papers/17

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Events at LOUIS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in National Cyber Summit by an authorized administrator of LOUIS.

Insider Threat Mitigation in Attribute based Encryption
Runhua Xu, James B.D. Joshi, Prashant Krishnamurthy, David Tipper
School of Information Science, University of Pittsburgh
135 North Bellefield Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
runhua.xu@pitt.edu,jjoshi@pitt.edu,prashant@sis.pitt.edu,tipper@tele.pitt.edu

ABSTRACT
Recent advances in computing have enabled cloud storage
service, among others, that collect and provide efficient long
term storage of huge amounts data that may include users’
privacy sensitive information. Concerns about the security
and privacy of the sensitive data stored in the cloud is one key
obstacle to the success of these cloud based applications and
services. To tackle these issues, Attribute based Encryption
(ABE) approaches, especially the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute
based Encryption (CP-ABE), have been shown to be very
promising. ABE helps provide access control solutions to
protect the privacy-sensitive information stored in the cloud
storage centers. However, use of an ABE approach in such
cases suffers from two key insider threats: insider threat due
to colluding users; and that due to a potentially malicious
or compromised authority center. Even though the users’
collusion has been addressed in the literature, to our best
knowledge, the authority center as an insider has not been
addressed, and existing schemes assume that the authority
is fully trusted or honest-but-curious. In this paper, we propose a new technical solution to mitigate the threat from
the authority as an insider in an ABE system. We present
analysis to show that the proposed work is efficient from the
perspective of algorithms and can mitigate the insider threat
in the authority party effectively.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptography; Public key (asymmetric) techniques; Access control; Authorization; Usability in
security and privacy; Management and querying of encrypted
data;

KEYWORDS
Insider threat, authority, data security, attribute based encryption, ciphertext-based attribute based encryption
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INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in Cloud Computing have enabled the applications that can generate or collect huge amounts of users’
personal/sensitive data. The cloud storage service is a very
promising approach to help aggregate and/or maintain these
sensitive data. According to a report from the Gartner Inc.,
in 2016, more than 50 percent of global 1000 companies will
have their customer-sensitive data stored in the public cloud.
NCS’17, Huntsville, Alabama USA

Security and privacy issues of the sensitive data are the main
concerns that stand as obstacles to the success of such applications. Hence, solutions to ensure protection of data stored
in the cloud from all potential threats are critically needed.
One key initial approach to ensure the security and privacy
of the sensitive data is employing cryptographic mechanisms,
such as symmetric encryption algorithms to help guarantee
the confidentiality of the stored sensitive data. However, such
mechanisms reduce the utility of the data and also introduce
new issues like key management. To tackle these issues, Sahai and Waters [11] propose an Attribute based Encryption
(ABE) that encrypts the data based on a specified access
structure over users’ attributes and provides fine-grained
access control on the encrypted data [6]. Bethencourt et al.
propose Ciphertext-Policy Attribute based Encryption (CPABE) scheme in [2] in order to make the ABE approaches
applicable in the data use/sharing scenarios in the cloud
computing environment. Here, the data owner encrypts the
data based on a specified access policy and only the users
who have the attributes that satisfy the access policy can
decrypt the ciphertext.
The ABE schemes support both confidentiality feature
and access control function for the data stored in the cloud.
When implementing ABE schemes within an infrastructure,
Authority is a critical component that is a fully trusted third
party that helps in setting up the ABE related parameter
such as the public keys, and in generating the users’ private
keys based on users’ authorized attributes. Even though the
security of the ABE schemes has been provided in literature
such as [7, 10], there is a lack of specific focus from the
perspective of the insider threat to check the security of the
ABE schemes.
We believe there are two possible types of insider attack
within an ABE scheme: attack through colluding users and
attack from the Authority when the assumption of its trustworthiness is not valid. In a collusion attack, a group of users
collaborate with each other in decrypting a ciphertext that is
not authorized to them by utilizing their respective attribute
related key components. While a collusion attack has been
well studied in the literature, to the best of our knowledge,
the protection against untrusted Authority has not been studied. An Authority can be untrusted because of malicious
intent of people managing it, or when it is compromised by
another entity. For instance, if the authority is deployed in
the cloud environment, the employee of the cloud service
provider may access the secret credentials of the authority.
Even though the authority is deployed in the private server
that is isolated physically, the system administrator may also
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be the potential insiders stealing the secret credentials from
the authority.
In this paper, we focus on the issues of insider threat in
the ABE ecosystem, especially the insider threat from the
Authority of ABE with the assumption of its trustworthiness
removed. We analyze the potential insider attacks in the
ABE systems and propose a new multi-authority CP-ABE
(MA-CP-ABE) scheme to help mitigate the threat. Then
we propose two approaches that are built on our proposed
multi-authority CP-ABE scheme, namely IN -tolerance and
IN −1 -tolerance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we analyze the potential insider threat in the ABE system.
Then we present the mitigation approaches in Section 3. We
propose a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme in Section 3.2,
and then present two mitigation solutions in Section 3.3. The
analysis and discussion are presented in Section 4. Finally, we
introduce the related work and conclude our work in Section
5 and Section 6, respectively.

2

INSIDER THREAT IN THE ABE

Here, we overview the ABE system, and then present the
potential insider threat in the ABE system.

2.1

ABE Roles/Components

In a typical ABE-based application, there are three elements
or roles:
• Data Owner who employs the ABE scheme to protect
the data stored in the cloud.
• Data User who downloads the encrypted data from
the cloud and uses the ABE scheme to decrypt it for
access.
• Authority who is responsible for generating the public
keys and users’ private keys based on users’ authorized attributes.
Note that we let Authority be a general role to represent
the authority component of ABE. There are still specific
roles in the authority center, such as system administrator,
attribute authenticator, and other employees. If the authority
server is deployed in the private cloud environment, the cloud
administrator and other cloud provider employees with access
are potential entities associated with the authority center.
To simplify the discussion, we use the Authority to represent
all of the roles in the authority center.

2.2

Potential Insider Threats

Based on the elements/roles discussed in Section 2.1 about
the ABE system, we can see the following potential insider
threats.
• A main insider threat is that of collusion among the
users to compromise data security. In essence, malicious users in the ABE system may collaborate with
each other to exchange/collect their key components
that are related to their attributes to decrypt the
ciphertext that is not authorized to them.
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• Another key insider threat comes from the Authority
who may compromise the authorities’ secret credentials or inadvertently misuse them. These Authorities
can be a malicious insider to modify or steal confidential or sensitive information for a personal gain.
Also, they can be a careless insider who inadvertently
make the authority center vulnerable to compromise.
To the best of our knowledge, the collusion threats have
been well-addressed in the literature for CP-ABE schemes;
however, the insider threat from the authority has not been
addressed in the literature, which is the focus of our paper.

3 INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION
3.1 Preliminaries
Before the introduction to our proposed multi-authority
CP-ABE, we first present the preliminaries of the CP-ABE
schemes.
Definition 3.1. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [1]. If a
secret-sharing scheme Π, is linear, it should satisfy the following two conditions:
• For each party, the generated shares should be a
vector (over Zp ).
• There should be a share-generating matrix, Ml×n ,for
the scheme. For each row in the matrix, let ρ be a
function such that ρ(i) maps to the i-th party. We
generate n−1 random number (over Zp ) and combine
with the secret s to get the column vector v. Then
S = M v should be the sharing vector for the secret
s and the share Si is for party ρ(i).
Suppose we have an access structure AS and Π is the
corresponding LSSS. We define the authorized set as S ∈ AS
and sharing set as I = {i : ρ(i)P
∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp }i∈I be
a set of constants that satisfy
i∈I ωi λi = s, where λi are
valid shares of the secret s by Π. According to [1], constants
ωi can be generated in polynomial time in the size of M .

3.2

Multi-Authority CP-ABE

3.2.1 CP-ABE Model. The CP-ABE scheme usually consists of four randomized algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
Decrypt that are described as follows [2]:
• Setup. The Setup algorithm is executed by the Authority to setup the parameters such as public keys
and master private keys.
• KeyGen. The KeyGen algorithm is executed by the
Authority to generate the users’ private keys based
on their authorized attributes.
• Encrypt. The Encrypt algorithm is executed by the
Data Owner to encrypt the data based on a specific
access policy.
• Decrypt. The Decrypt algorithm is executed by the
Data User to decrypt the data using the applied
private keys from the Authority.
3.2.2 Our Construction. Suppose we have n authorities
that are accessible to handle the requests from users in the
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ABE system. These authorities are independent with each
other. Let Ai be the i-th authority.
Setup(U, g, G) → (P Ki , M SKi ):
The Setup algorithm takes the global parameters and the
attributes set as the input to generate the public key and
master secret key. For each authority Ai , given the universe
of attributes U and a generator g of G with order p, the Ai
generates its parameters independently. The authority Ai
first randomly chooses elements αi , ai ∈ Zp as the random
exponents, and selects xi,j ∈ Zp for each attributes in U .
Then it computes the public key as follows:
P K = {g, e(g, g) αi , g ai , atti,j = (g xi,j )∀j∈U }
And keeps the master key as follows:
M SK = {αi }
KeyGen(M SKi , Si ) → Ki :
The KeyGen algorithm takes the master secret key and
users’ attribute set as the input to generate users’ private key.
For the given attribute set Si , the authority Ai first generates
random elements ti ∈ Zp . Then computes the private key as
follows:
i
Ki = {k1 = g αi · g ai ti , k2 = g ti , k3 = (attti,j
)∀j∈Si }

Encrypt(M, (A, ρ), P Ki ) → CT :
The Encrypt algorithm takes the message, public keys
from all authorities, and the specified access structure to
generate the final ciphertext. The access structure includes
an n × l access matrix A with function ρ mapping each row
to an attribute. It first chooses a random secret s ∈ Zp
and random elements {yk }1≤k≤l−1 ∈ Zp to construct a vector v = (s, {yk }1≤k≤l−1 ). For each row of A, it chooses a
random element rx ∈ Zp . Then it randomly generates a sequence Q = {q1 , q2 , ..., qi , ..., ql }1≤qi ≤n . Finally, it computes
the ciphertext as:
C=M

Y

(e(g, g) sαqi )∀qi ∈Q
0

C = gs
~

T

x
Cx = g aqi Ax~v · att−r
qi ,x

Dx = g rx
And output the ciphertext as:
0

CT = {C, C , {Cx , Dx }x∈(A,ρ) , (A, ρ), Q}
Decrypt(CT, Ki , P Ki ) → M :
The Decrypt algorithm takes the ciphertext, the public
keys from all authorities, and the private keys applied from
all authorities for attribute set S. Suppose that S satisfies
the (A, ρ) and let I (A,ρ) ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined as I (A,ρ) =
{x : ρ(x) ∈ S}. Let ωx ∈ Zp be a set of constants where
P
~
x∈I ωx Ax = (1, 0, ..., 0). Then it extracts the sequence Q
from the ciphertext CT and selects the elements from Ki
and P Ki based on the sequence. Finally, the message M is
recovered as follows:
Q
(e(Cx , ki,2 ) · e(Dx , ki,3 )) ωx
Q
M =C·
0
e(C , ki,1 )
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3.3

Insider Threat Mitigation Solutions

Here we first present two specific insider threat issues associated with the authority.
• In the environment without insiders’ collusion, how
to prevent an insider from a single authority directly
compromising the ABE system?
• In the environment with insiders’ collusion, how to
prevent insider threat resulting from different authorities collaborating with each other compromising the
ABE system?
For the first insider threat, our proposed multi-authority
CP-ABE scheme in Section 3.2 can directly prevent the
insider’s attack from a single authority. In the single-authority
scenario, it is not possible to prevent the insider from stealing
the confidential credentials. In the multi-authority scenario,
the data is encrypted using the components from different
public keys and the private keys are also generated by different
authorities. Even though an insider threat agent can get the
confidential credentials from his/her authority, he cannot
decrypt the users’ ciphertext.
For the second insider threat, we present two approaches
to mitigate the collusion of insiders who are from different
authorities. We named the two approaches as IN tolerance
and IN −1 tolerance as shown in Definition 3.2 and Definition
3.3, respectively.
Definition 3.2. IN tolerance. Suppose there are N authorities in the multi-authority ABE environment. The ABE
system can resist the insiders’ collusion attack from all N
authorities.
Definition 3.3. IN −1 tolerance. Suppose there are N authorities in the multi-authority ABE environment. The ABE
system can resist the insiders’ collusion attack from at most
N − 1 authorities.
3.3.1 IN Tolerance. This approach can let the ABE system be tolerant from insiders from the authority set with
size N in the multi-authority environment. Our proposed
MA-CP-ABE scheme supports multi-authority that indicates
any party can simply act as an ABE authority. Consequently,
to prevent the insiders’ collusion completely, the data owner
can play as an ABE authority itself, namely, self-authority.
Then the data owner ensures that at least one component
related to the attributes (e.g., e(g, g) αi , atti,j ) should come
from the self-authority during the encryption phase. Even
though the insiders from the N authorities collaborate to
break the ciphertext, they cannot acquire enough key components (e.g., k1 , k3 ) to break the ciphertext. This is because
the data owner has at least one key component, and can not
leak his secret credentials to these insiders.
However, the IN tolerance solution has its limitation. One
responsibility of the authority is to provide key service, generating the users’ private keys Ki based on the attributes.
Consequently, the self-authority should be available when
the data user needs the key services.
3.3.2 IN −1 Tolerance. This approach can ensure the ABE
system that resist insiders from the N − 1 authority parties in
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Algorithm 1 The sequence Q generating algorithm.
Input: the number of attributes in the access structure l; the
number of authorities N ; the identity set of authorities
SA .
Output: the generated sequence Q.
1: if l ≥ N then
2:
QA ← select all identities from SA .
3:
Qrest ← randomly select l − N identities from SA .
4:
Q ← QA ∪ Qrest
5:
Shuffle the Q.
6: else
7:
Q ← randomly select l identities from SA .
8:
Shuffle the Q
9: end if
10: return Q

the multi-authority environment. That indicates the solution
can resist at most N − 1 insiders among the N authorities
based on probability. Unlike IN tolerance, this solution does
not require self-authority. As the sequence Q represents the
identities of the authorities where the encryption algorithm
will extract the components for each attribute, the idea is
to randomly select the sequence Q from different authorities.
Thus, the key issue is how to generate the sequence Q, as
showing in Algorithm 1. As the length of the sequence is
different from the number of authorities, there are two cases
to be considered.
• l ≥ N , which indicates the number of attributes
in the access policy is greater than or equal to the
number of authorities.
• l < N , which indicates the number of attributes in
the access policy is less than the number of authorities.
Here, we discuss in detail about Algorithm 1. In the case of
l ≥ N , we first select all identities from the N authorities
to ensure that we have enrolled all authorities. Then we
randomly select the l − N identities to fill the rest positions.
Finally, we shuffle the sequence to keep its randomness. In
the case of l < N , it is much simpler as we can just randomly
select l authorities first and then shuffle the sequence.

4 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Security Analysis
4.1.1 Security of MA-CP-ABE. The security proof for multiauthority CP-ABE systems by the following simulation game
between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Consider the following game that is similar to simulation
game in [4, 12]:
- Setup The adversary sends a list of attribute sets
to each authority. The challenger generates public
parameters using Setup algorithm and sends them
to the adversary.
- Secret Key Queries The adversary can make as many
secret key queries as it wants to the authorities by
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providing the sets of attributes S1 , ..., Sn Then the
challenger responds the query request by providing
the adversary the corresponding secret keys.
- Challenge The adversary should specify two equal
length messages M0 and M1 and an access structure
(A, ρ) such that none of sets of attributes S1 , ..., Sn
from Secret Key Queries phase satisfy the access
structure. The challenger flips a random coin b ∈
{0, 1}. Then the challenger encrypts Mb under the
access structure (A, ρ) and sends the ciphertext to
the adversary.
- More Secret Key Queries Similar to the Secret Key
Queries phase, the adversary could make more secret
key queries with several sets of attributes under the
same constriction that the attribute sets can not
satisfy the access structure in the Secret Key Queries
phase.
0
- Guess The adversary outputs a guess b that message
Mb0 has been encrypted.
The adversary A is claimed to be successful if it can
0
correctly identify the ciphertext, i.e., if b = b . The advantage
0
of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b = b] − 21 .
Theorem 4.1. A multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute
based encryption scheme is secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above
simulation game.
Here we present a brief proof to the Theorem 4.1.
Proof. The multi-authority CP-ABE scheme is built on
the single-authority CP-ABE that is proposed by Waters [12].
And the security assumption that our proposed work relies
on is decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent
(BDHE) assumption.
The methodology about the proof procedure is a kind of
reduction proof. The adversary A tries to break our scheme,
while challenger C tries to solve the mathematical hard problem by taking the advantage of the adversary A. For instance,
suppose that the adversary A has non-negligible advantage
 = AdvA to break the simulation game. Then the challenger C can break the q-parallel BDHE problem by taking
the adversary A’s non-negligible advantage . However, the
q-parallel BDHE assumption is proved, i.e., no polynomial
time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving
BDHE challenge. Therefore, A does not have non-negligible
advantage to break our system.
Note that the basic architecture of our proposed scheme
is the same as that of [12]. We conclude that the differences
in the scheme construction are:
(1) The first difference is the construction of component
C in the encryption phase. We multiply more public
key component e(g, g) sαi .
(2) The second difference is the random selection of
component atti,j in the encryption phase.
Based on the security proof presented in [12] and since our
proposed scheme builds on that with differences are not only
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as mentioned here, we believe the proof of security of MPCP-ABE can be shown by simply extending earlier proof.
Thus, we do not present the specific proof of our proposed
scheme here.
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component T as follows:

Q
T = Q

i∈Q e(C

0

, ki,1 )

(e(Cx , ki,2 )e(Dx , ki,3 )) ωx

i∈Q,x∈I

s αi
· g ai ti )
i∈Q e(g , g
~x ~
ai A
v T · att−rx , g ti )e(g rx , attti ))) ωx
i∈Q,x∈I (e(g
i,x
i,j

Q

4.1.2 Insider Tolerance Analysis. There are two types of
attack in authority insiders: collusion based and non-collusion
based.
In the non-collusion case, even though the individual insider could acquire confidential credentials from the corresponding authority, they are not able to break the users’
ciphertext because of the multi-authority environment.
In the collusion case, suppose the probability that the
authority Ai has an insider is pi . The theoretical probability
Q
of the insiders could be calculated as pinsider = i∈Q pi .
For the two approaches mentioned in Section 3.3, we analyze
the probability of an insider attack as follows:
• IN tolerance:
In this approach, the self-authority can be viewed
as the (n + 1)th authority in the ABE system, while
pn+1 = 0. Because the data owner itself could not
be the insider to break its ciphertext.
Consequently,
Q
the probability pinsider = i∈Q pi · pn+1 = 0. This
indicates that the approach can fully prevent the
insiders from the authorities.
• IN −1 tolerance:
In this approach, despite the probability pi , the overall probability is also related to the selection of authorities. There are two cases: if l < N , pinsider =
N
Cl−1
ClN

l
= N −l+1
i∈Q pi ; if l ≥ N , we should
Q
use all authorities, thus pinsider = i∈Q pi . For the
worst case, pinsider = 1, it requires pi → 1. However,
if there is one honest authority, px = 0, the final probability pinsider = 0. Thus our approach can resist at
most N − 1 insiders out of N authorities.

4.2

Q

i∈Q pi

Q

Complexity Analysis

In this section, we analyze the complexity of our proposed
MA-CP-ABE scheme. To the best of our knowledge, there
is only one other proposed multi-authority CP-ABE scheme
[8]. We compare the encryption and decryption efficiency of
our proposed scheme with that of [8] theoretically.
In the ABE schemes, the main complexity is related to
the computing on the exponent and the bilinear map. Thus,
we analyze these computation times for these two in the two
schemes, which are shown in Table 1. From the table, we can
see that our proposed scheme is more efficient than that of
the [8] both in encryption and decryption costs, respectively.

4.3

Correctness

Here we give the correctness proof of our proposed multiauthority CP-ABE scheme. We first calculate a temporary

= Q

P
e(g, g)

=

i∈Q

P
e(g, g)

i∈Q

P
=

e(g, g)

i∈Q

(ai ti

= e(g, g)

i∈Q

P
i∈Q

x∈I

~x ~
A
v T ωx )

s(αi +ai ti )

P
e(g, g)

s(αi +ai ti )

P

ai ti s

sαi

Then the message M could be recovered as follows:
M
C
=
T

Q

(e(g, g) sαqi )qi ∈Q

P
e(g, g)

i∈Q

sαi

P
=

qi ∈Q

M e(g, g)

P
e(g, g)

i∈Q

sαi

sαi

=M

The specific inference presented above shows that our
construction of MA-CP-ABE scheme could correctly recover
the encrypted data. That indicates our proposed scheme
achieves the correctness requirement.

5

RELATED WORK

Attribute based Encryption (ABE) scheme is first proposed
by Sahai and Waters [11], which provides both confidentiality
feature and access control function on the encrypted data by
specifying an access policy over the users’ attributes. The initial version of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute based Encryption
(CP-ABE) is proposed by Bethencourt et al. [2]. In CP-ABE
scheme, the access structure is associated with ciphertext and
users’ private key is associated with their attributes. Thus it
is applicable in the cloud storage scenarios.
Multi-authority issues have been addressed in the literature [3–5, 9]. The initial work of multi-authority in ABE
system is presented by Chase [4], where he proposes a hierarchical authority architecture that includes a central authority
and several attribute authorities. Then Božović et al. [3]
try to reduce the importance of the central authority and
propose a honest-but-curious central authority. The scheme
from Gorasia et al. [5] is also based on this architecture but
more efficient decryption algorithms.
Two multi-authority ABE schemes, proposed in [8, 9], respectively, incorporate distributed authorities that indicates
no requirement for any global coordination (central authority); the scheme proposed in [8] is a CP-ABE scheme, while
the scheme proposed in [9] is a KP-ABE scheme. A KP-ABE
scheme is not useful in the cloud storage scenarios, and the
scheme proposed in [8] cannot be applied in our proposed
insider threat mitigation solutions. Even though the users’
collusion that can be viewed as a kind of insider threat in
ABE system has been addressed in these schemes, the insider
threat from the authority has not been considered. These
schemes always assume that the authority as fully trusted
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Table 1: Comparison of efficiency

schemes
Encryption
Decryption

Our scheme

[8]

(4l + 1)Cexp
3|S|Cmap + |S|Cexp

(4|i| + 1)Cexp + |l|Cmap
3|S|Cmap + 3|S|Cexp

1

2

Let |Cexp |, |Cmap be the calculation of exponent and bilinear map over G, respectively.
l is the attribute number in the access structure, and |S| is the minimum set of users’ attributes.

or honest-but-curious, which may not be the case as we have
discussed in this paper.

6

CONCLUSION

Recently, cloud storage service is being widely used over the
Internet as it provides convenience for users in terms of data
storage and management. However, users’ concern on the
security and privacy issues of the sensitive data stored in
the cloud is the main obstacle in the successful uses of these
cloud based applications. Even though the Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute based Encryption provides both confidentiality and
access control features for the cloud storage scenarios, the
insider threat in the ABE system, especially with regards
to the authority component, has not been addressed in the
literature. In this paper, we focus on analyzing the insider
threat in the authority component of the ABE system and
have proposed technical solutions to mitigate these insider
threat by proposing new multi-authority CP-ABE scheme,
and two insider threat mitigation solutions based on the MPCP-ABE schemes. Also, the security proof of the proposed
multi-authority CP-ABE scheme has been presented. Based
on the analysis, our proposed approach is efficient as can
be seen from the complexity analysis and can mitigate the
insider threat effectively.
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